

Massive data breaches

– e.g., Target, Sony –

were the result of a

successful phishing

attack



Patient zero



The first patient in an outbreak who is noticed by health authorities typically triggers a response or investigation



From patient zero investigators gather information to map the progression of a disease outbreak

- Who is patient zero?
- What are his symptoms?
- Where was he found?
- Where did he travel from and to?
- When did he travel?
- What threat does his condition pose?

Index domains are the "patient zeros" of cyber investigations

- Who is the domain holder?
 - Notify the breach victim
 - Pursue the cyber attacker
- Where and when were the domains registered?
- What other domains have similar registration data?

Attacks often involve a conspiracy of domains... use index domain to identify that conspiracy



How do first responders use Whois?

Criminal Abuse of Domain Names:
Bulk Registration and Contact Information Access

http://www.interisle.net/sub/CriminalDomainAbuse.pdf


CASE STUDY CRIMINAL DOMAINS IN .TOKYO


 Abuse activity in .TOKYO from December 12, 2018 through December 25, 2018

Registrar	IANA ID	Criminal Abuse Domains Identified	Percent
GMO Internet, Inc. d/b/a Onamae.com	49	8,713	100.0
NameCheap, Inc.	1068	2	0.0

8,715 .TOKYO criminal abuse domain names

Nearly all of these were registered using a single registrar





WHY THIS REGISTRAR?

- VERY CHEAP DOMAIN REGISTRATIONS
- CUSTOMERS CAN REGISTER IN VOLUME
- CUSTOMERS CAN GENERATE RANDOM LOOKING DOMAINS

CHEAP DOMAIN NAMES CONTRIBUTE TO A CRIMINAL MARKETPLACE IN WHICH SMALL INVESTMENTS CAN YIELD EXTRAORDINARY RETURNS



1000s OF DOMAIN
NAMES CAN BE
ACQUIRED FOR
PENNIES PER
DOMAIN FROM
REGISTRARS LIKE
GMO INTERNET



MAILING LISTS

CAN BE

PURCHASED IN

THE DARK WEB OR

ONLINE



RANSOMWARE CAN BE PURCHASED AS A SERVICE FOR €35

PHISHING KITS CAN
BE DOWNLOADED
FOR FREE FROM
SOCIAL MEDIA SITES

ONLINE TUTORIALS
ARE AVAILABLE
FROM YOUTUBE



ASSUMING A
RANSOMWARE
EXTORTION FEE OF
\$200-500 USD, A
RANSOMWARE
ATTACK IS
PROFITABLE WITH
A HANDFUL OF
VICTIMS



EVEN A SINGLE
RANSOMWARE
OR PHISHING
CAMPAIGN IS A
LUCRATIVE
ENTERPRISE

IDENTIFYING CRIMINAL ACTORS: SEARCH AND PIVOT

- .TOKYO sample spans a "post-GDPR" time period
- Use historical and recent Whois records
- Use {registrant name, registrant organization, registrant email} to
 - SEARCH historical Whois databases
 - PIVOT to other databases or social media
- to identify the criminal actors
- Only some Whois records contain contact data
- Assume that criminals submit inaccurate or fraudulently composed data


WHAT DOES SEARCH-AND-PIVOT REVEALS?

- The harmful content or attack messages
- Where criminal actors host infrastructure, e.g.
 - Malware or ransomware executables
 - Phishing or financial fraud web pages
 - Political influence campaign material
 - Mail servers that send phishing lures
 - DNS servers that support DDoS attacks
- Other domain holders that may be part of a criminal enterprise
- Other Top-level domains in which the criminal actor has registered names



WHAT SEARCH-AND-PIVOT FROM "PATIENT ZERO" REVEALED

- The suspect appears to have used GMO's bulk registration tools to generate thousands of random-looking domains names in matters of minutes.
 - GMO offered .TOKYO domains registrations at very low cost.
- The suspect provided a registrant address in Japan.
 - The suspects targeted .TOKYO but not exclusively.
 .INFO, .CLUB, .ONLINE, .XYZ, .BIZ, .SPACE, and .WORK were also targeted.
- The suspect hosted Japanese phishing or malware at three hosting providers:
 - InterQ GMO Internet, Inc., IDC Frontier, Inc., Sakura Internet, Inc.





ARE ESSENTIAL
IF FIRST RESPONDERS AND
LAW ENFORCEMENT
ARE TO IDENTIFY VICTIMS
AND CRIMINAL ACTORS

BUT... DUE TO AN OVERLY BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE EU GDPR

PUBLIC WHOIS IS NOW DARK




ADVERSE EFFECTS OF ICANN WHOIS POLICY

Blanket redaction

Inhibits searches to correlate domains or actors to attacks

No discrimination between EU data subjects and legal persons



No policy for timely or predictable access


No accreditation frameworks

"One size fits all"

Registries are redacting more data than is required by GDPR

Solution assumes all data protection laws will align with GDPR

EFFECT OF ICANN POLICY ON ACCESS TO HISTORICAL COMPLETE WHOIS RECORDS



Facts & Figures: Whois Policy Changes
Impair Blocklisting Defenses
http://lnnk.in/@whoisimpedesblocklisting





Creative Commons

- Slide 2, 3:Lassa Fever investigation, Mike Blyth https://www.flickr.com/photos/blyth/
- Slide 3: Enzootic Plague investigation, CDC Global, https://www.flickr.com/photos/cdcglobal/
- Slide 4: World Map, Share reproductions, https://www.flickr.com/photos/shaireproductions/
- Slide 10: Computer Hackers, https://www.flickr.com/photos/121483302@N02/
- All other images from Pixabay Images